Following his visit to Lebanon on July 20, US envoy Tom Barrack explicitly said that while President Trump wants to see a “prosperous Lebanon,” Washington cannot offer any guarantees with regards to halting Israeli attacks and violations.
His remarks confirmed the lived reality of the population’s powerlessness in the face of Israel’s ceasefire breaches and Hezbollah’s reluctance to disarm, despite repeated international assurances of support. Israeli drones hover over Beirut daily, with regular bombardment, demolitions, and assassinations in South Lebanon and the Beqaa. Meanwhile, Israel still occupies five strategic points in South Lebanon. The continuous breaches to the ceasefire that ended the war with Israel leaves residents scared and pessimistic of what may come next if no long-term solution is put forth.
Politically, the Lebanese face a rough choice between what the United States demands and what Hezbollah wants. Barrack has been pushing the Lebanese authorities to disarm Hezbollah, yet he offers no real guarantees with regards to pushing for an Israeli withdrawal. Israel continues to proactively dismantle Hezbollah’s infrastructure south of the Litani river, as part of a mutual US-Israeli expectation for what ought to happen following the ceasefire deal in November. On the other hand, Hezbollah and its allies are postponing the practical, material, and operational discussion that clearly specifies a timetable for disarmament, throwing the ball in Israel’s court until further notice while advancing mixed signals about its readiness for domestic discussion.
Regional wars will not bring political transitions or social transformation—not to Lebanon or the region
Caught between immense external pressure and internal division, it becomes clear that Lebanon needs a proactive foreign policy centering the country’s interests, alliances, and points of strength. Regional wars will not bring political transitions or social transformation—not to Lebanon or the region. Lebanon cannot be an observer or cheerleader. Domestically and externally, Lebanon needs to prioritize four policy directions: (1) unify the country’s security and defense strategies and ensure a strong social cohesion; (2) advocate more forcefully for the end of Israeli aggression, by leveraging US and European support; (3) improve relations with international institutions by advancing banking reforms; (4) ensure Lebanon’s neutrality in the face of military confrontations which do not concern its direct interest, while committing to protecting its borders and upholding justice and reform in the region. The last point particularly concerns actively mobilizing in the direction of pressuring an end to the genocide in Gaza and holding Israel accountable for its crimes against humanity.
War has no room for transformative politics
During the war between Iran and Israel in June 2025, people living in Lebanon endured constant, suffocating anxiety, fearing that the confrontation would spill over to their country still reeling from a devastating war with Israel last year. During those 12 days, Prime Minister Nawaf Salam and President Joseph Aoun urged calm through a series of coordinated statements, while denouncing the Israeli strikes on Iran, calling for regional peace and stability, and warning of any spillover to neighboring countries. Hezbollah’s local opponents, particularly the Lebanese Forces party and its allies, hoped the war would bring down the Iranian regime altogether, and with it, Hezbollah’s regional gateway. Meanwhile, Hezbollah’s allies hoped that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu would be unable to fulfill his immediate strategic objectives, leading to a domestic political crisis in Israel and allowing Iran to score a short-term victory.
Some political forces in Lebanon argue that a crippled Iran will liberate the country from Tehran’s hold; others argue that a strong Iran can protect Lebanon from Israel’s hold
Some political forces in Lebanon argue that a crippled Iran will liberate the country from Tehran’s hold; others argue that a strong Iran can protect Lebanon from Israel’s hold. The former affirm that the fall of the Iranian regime would mark the end of an era in which militias contributed to the breakdown of state authority in countries across the region, including in Lebanon. The argument goes on to assume that a new regime in Tehran would be a democratic one, upholding both stability and rule of law. The latter group, on the other hand, argues that Iran and Lebanon have similar, uniform interests in countering Israel’s vision for the region.
Both arguments suffer major flaws; the first being the assumption that history is linear, and that the fall of an autocratic regime leads automatically to stability, overlooking numerous examples in the region where the opposite occurred. On the other hand, those arguing that Lebanon and the rest of the Arab world need Iran to establish some kind of power “balance” with Israel ignore the fact that Iran has repeatedly used Lebanon as a battleground for its own interests, oftentimes speaking in the name of the Lebanese state, as it did after October 7, 2023.
The second issue with both arguments, from a Lebanese standpoint, is that they seek to employ geopolitical dynamics to achieve gains for the country’s political class, serving as a distraction from the need for genuine domestic reform. Over the past three decades and beyond, Lebanon has been deeply impacted by regional dynamics, including everything from the Israeli occupation and then withdrawal from the South in 2000, the Syrian occupation following the civil war in the early 1990s and the withdrawal of Syrian troops in 2005; the Arab Spring in 2011; the weakening of the Gulf’s influence in Lebanon after 2011; and the fall of the Assad regime in 2025.
Despite these regional shifts, the primary source of Lebanon’s fragility has remained unchanged: a paralyzed, sectarian, undemocratic, and unproductive system
Yet, despite these regional shifts, the primary source of Lebanon’s fragility has remained unchanged: a paralyzed, sectarian, undemocratic, and unproductive system. This dysfunction has produced a corrupt state, a lack of political will to move toward a clear state monopoly on arms, and an unsustainable and collapsed economy. Regional wars erase the urgency of needing to transform the country from within, and to establish a real, sustainable safety net for all Lebanese across sects and geographies.
Lebanon needs to prioritize itself
Lebanon needs to reassess its position on the international stage. Before it can shape its role globally, the country must first act as an independent state, prioritizing its boundaries, interests, and alliances.
Hezbollah’s military and political power has diminished. This shift offers an opportunity to all political factions in the country, and particularly those represented in the current government, to put aside power-sharing considerations and proactively lobby for a clear disarmament timetable, but also for a bold diplomatic strategy that puts Lebanon back into the global conversation against Israeli transgressions.
Only a proactive foreign policy can help support Lebanon. This entails Lebanese leaders going beyond passively relying on the promises of leaders in the Global North. Instead, they need to actively advocate for their country’s sovereignty, and pressure stakeholders in Europe and North America to hold Israel accountable.
Lebanon needs to make a compelling case for its sovereignty. It already has sympathetic partners in the Gulf and Europe. At a time where Netanyahu’s credibility is at a low point among many Global North nations, the Lebanese government should engage and mobilize the Lebanese diaspora to pressure Israel’s international backers for an immediate withdrawal from South Lebanon and an end to daily aggressions.
Such positioning needs to be backed by robust domestic policy that reasserts the government’s authority over all of Lebanon. A key priority should be to create a direct link with Lebanon’s Shia community, in a way that does not reinforce Hezbollah and the Amal Movement which have long acted as gatekeepers to that segment of the Lebanese population. Achieving such an ambitious goal necessitates that the government commits to economic reform policies that lays the foundation for a sustainable recovery and growth. Only then can the state properly provide long-term investment in schooling, healthcare, and key social services historically outsourced to sectarian elites.
In the short term, authorities can employ executive power to chip at the entrenched privileges of the financial and commercial elites holding the reform process hostage. The current government has both the legitimacy and the mandate to take the fiscal and monetary measures needed to restore popular trust and build real credibility across constituencies, including those historically co-opted by Hezbollah and its allies.
A role for Washington
The United States has clear interests in Lebanon, as do many other countries. But the primary interest of all stakeholders needs to be ensuring stability in Lebanon and putting an end to the cycle of violence that only reproduces cycles of occupation and militarism.
Hence, if the US intends to assist Lebanon in determining its political and economic path and play a healthy role in the process, it ought to incorporate the collective interests of the Lebanese people. While the international community has pushed and pressed Lebanese leaders regarding their insistence on much-needed economic reforms, the rhetoric in Washington regarding Israeli violence in Lebanon has drawn the ire of many in the country, further amplifying sectarian tensions and sensitivities.
If the US intends to assist Lebanon in determining its political and economic path and play a healthy role in the process, it ought to incorporate the collective interests of the Lebanese people
Positive steps the Lebanese government has to take to assert its monopoly on arms—including reclaiming control of the airport and border points, curbing local violence induced by Hezbollah’s supporters, and working to curb armed activity in the South—have been met with Israeli bad faith. Such a response aligns with Israel’s broader track record in the region, and especially in Gaza and Syria.
If Washington is truly committed to stability, its blind support for Israel undermines that goal, at the expense of the well-being of hundreds of thousands of people living in South Lebanon, the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beqaa region and the country as a whole.
Karim Safieddine is a Lebanese organizer and researcher from Lebanon, particularly engaging with the Mada Network and secular clubs.
Jad Shahrour is the communication manager and spokesperson at the Samir Kassir Foundation, and a journalist and political activist based in Lebanon.