Lebanon’s approach to displaced populations is shaped by a complex set of factors, including the legacy of wars, persistent security concerns, and economic scarcity. The strategy in place has emphasized restricting legal pathways, limiting access to livelihoods, and maintaining social separation between citizens and refugees.
Lebanon has been going through a severe financial crisis for over six years. Real GDP has declined by nearly 40 percent and the Lebanese pound lost over 98 percent of its value since 2019, triggering hyperinflation and an unprecedented loss of purchasing power. The labor market has been similarly affected. The unemployment rate rose from 11.4 percent in 2018–2019 to 29.6 percent in early 2022, and youth (aged between 15–24) are particularly hard hit, with nearly 48 percent of them being unemployed.
Public services have been severely strained as the state’s capacity to absorb social and economic shocks weakened drastically. Simultaneously, the operational capacities of NGOs and donor programs, which previously helped mitigate crises and support both Lebanese citizens and displaced populations, have shrunk due to funding shortfalls, inflation, and logistical constraints
Within this socioeconomic landscape, Lebanon’s Palestinian community has been disproportionately impacted by the financial collapse. Palestinian refugee camps are generational ecosystems shaped by policies that were never intended to be permanent, yet have come to define the lives of tens of thousands of people.
Exclusion and labor restrictions deepen instability
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have historically been subjected to legal and structural forms of exclusion. Law No. 296 of 2001, which revised and tightened the provisions of the 1969 Legislative Decree No. 11614, bars Palestinians from owning property. This restriction sits within a wider regulatory framework shaped by Decree No. 17561 of 1964, which governs the employment of foreign workers and requires non-Lebanese nationals, including Palestinians, to obtain work permits under conditions that are often difficult to meet. Subsequent amendments to the Labor Law in 2010 reduced certain permit fees and eased reciprocity requirements for Palestinian workers, but implementation remained limited.
Although ministerial decisions passed in 2005 opened a number of occupations to Palestinians born in Lebanon, Palestinians were still excluded from practicing liberal professions, such as medicine, law, engineering, and pharmacy. In December 2021, the Ministry of Labor issued a decree to ease access to certain professions, including those requiring syndicate membership. Yet because this measure is a ministerial decision rather than a statutory change, it remains reversible and does not structurally alter the underlying legal framework. The political backlash and opposition was immediate.
In February 2026, Lebanese authorities introduced a new administrative mechanism to facilitate practice permits for Palestinian nurses. The measure allows registered Palestinian nursing graduates to apply for annual authorizations, subject to employer sponsorship and proof that no Lebanese candidate is available. While presented as a pragmatic response to labor shortages, the step constitutes a procedural adjustment rather than legal reform. The permits remain time-bound, employer-specific, and discretionary, and they do not amend the labor law or ensure equal access to syndicate protections or social security benefits. As such, the decision expands access within a restrictive framework without altering the structural exclusion underpinning Palestinian labor rights in Lebanon.
In the Shatila refugee camp, located in southern Beirut, 40,000 people live in just one square kilometer. Mohammed, a 40-year-old coffee shop owner, was born in the camp, but does not want to be Lebanese. “I am Palestinian,” he said, “I just want Palestinians to have the right to work and the rights to a dignified life.” His words highlight that, beyond legal barriers, many refugees maintain a strong sense of national identity while demanding basic economic and social rights, access to jobs, fair work conditions, and the ability to live with dignity.
Since these activities take place outside formal labor regulation, earnings are often low, unstable, and paid in cash, with no social protections or labor rights
Palestinian in Shatila face a severely constrained labor market. Almost 94 percent of employed Palestinians in Lebanon are forced to rely on informal work to survive. Yassin, a young man in his 20s said: “Sometimes I help in clothing shops, sometimes I sell the bread my mom makes. But there are thousands of people like me in this camp, so how much bread am I going to sell? And how many shops are there? There aren’t enough [job opportunities] for all of us.”
Many young Palestinians, especially those from camps such as Shatila, depend on casual, informal, or precarious forms of work, including day labor in construction and manual trades, small-scale commerce, unregulated services, and micro enterprise within their communities. Since these activities take place outside formal labor regulation, earnings are often low, unstable, and paid in cash, with no social protections or labor rights.
Participation in the informal economy produces a fragmented and marginalized workforce whose human capital in terms of youth, ambition, and labor capacity remains underused, with few pathways toward stable employment or upward mobility.
Added gender vulnerabilities
Women in Shatila and other Palestinian refugee communities face even greater barriers to economic participation than men. Overall unemployment rates among Palestinian refugees stand at 32 percent; however, the gender difference in unemployment and participation in the labor market showcases further inequalities: While the gender difference in unemployment rates—31.3 percent for men and 35.6 percent for women—is modest in absolute terms, it becomes significant when viewed against participation rates. Only 17.6 percent of women are in the labor force, compared with 65.1 percent of men. In effect, the few women who attempt to enter paid employment are more likely to remain excluded. The result is a structural cycle of economic dependence that reinforces vulnerability.
Lebanon ranks 119th out of 146 countries in the World Economic Forum Gender Gap Report 2022, reflecting a high level of gender inequality. Economic collapse, soaring unemployment, and widespread poverty affect all residents, but women, particularly refugees, bear a disproportionate share of the social and economic consequences. Enduring compounded levels of marginalization, Palestinian women’s work in Lebanon is often precarious and unprotected, largely confined to informal or home-based activities such as sewing, food preparation, small-scale trade, and caregiving.
Support and opportunities for refugees
Support for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon combines formal vocational training, market-driven programs, and community-based initiatives aimed at enhancing youth employability and social inclusion. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s (UNRWA) Technical and Vocational Education and Training program plays a central role. Through its vocational training centers, including the Siblin Training Center, UNRWA offers trade, semi-professional, and specialized courses from carpentry, welding, plumbing, diesel mechanics, and electrical installation to computer maintenance, hairdressing, and media editing.
Complementing this, the NGO Anera provides market-oriented vocational training across Beirut and refugee camps, integrating technical skills such as plumbing, catering, agriculture, solar‑panel installation, Information and Communications Technology, and handicrafts with soft skills and employability support. The International Labor Organization, in cooperation with UNRWA, also promotes initiatives to help youth overcome barriers to formal employment.
Funding cuts have forced programs to scale back dramatically
Beyond institutional programs, grassroots organizations also play a vital role. Basmeh & Zeitooneh delivers vocational and life-skills courses, community education, and small-enterprise support, while the Children and Youth Center, a camp-based organization led by residents, offers informal education, recreational activities, and psychosocial support for children and adolescents.
These initiatives, however, are under severe strain. Funding cuts have forced programs to scale back dramatically. Basmeh & Zeitooneh reported that reductions in US foreign aid forced their once ambitious Makani centers, which provided psychosocial support, education, life skills, and community counseling, to operate at lifesaving only levels. At the same time, UNRWA, which underpins much of the broader support ecosystem, faces an annual shortfall of roughly $200 million, jeopardizing critical services in health, education, sanitation, and cash assistance. The European Union Institute for Security Studies warns that defunding vital programs plunges Palestinian communities deeper into hardship and jeopardizes social cohesion. Sustained funding for youth initiatives is not a luxury, it is one of the only levers left to build real, long-term stability. With marketable skills, young Palestinians can forge livelihoods, contribute to the local economy, and reduce their dependence on aid.
As such, targeted interventions such as vocational training and community-based education create limited but meaningful pathways to income and reinforce basic resilience. They do not alter the underlying legal framework, but they help mitigate its effects.
A longer-term strategy, however, is required. Dependence on emergency aid keeps communities like those living in Shatila in a permanent state of precarity. Investment in sustainable solutions, including small enterprise development, skills transfer, community infrastructure, and local economic initiatives, can enable residents to generate income, retain knowledge, and build self-sufficiency. These approaches must be coupled with policy reform on labor rights, particularly the restrictive work permit regime and syndicate barriers that exclude refugees from regulated professions.
Strengthening internal capacities while addressing the legal architecture that constrains access to the labor market is more durable than short-term relief. It is a prerequisite for economic participation, social cohesion, and dignity.
Hedi Boughanmi is a researcher and advocate with experience in donor relations, humanitarian project management, and journalism. His work focuses on amplifying the voices of minorities, migrants, and refugees across the MENA region.