This brief is part of the project “Law in Brief: Syria’s Transition” by TIMEP’s Legal Unit.
For nearly seven decades, civil society work in Syria has been governed by the restrictive Associations and Private Institutions Law No. 93 of 1958, which was weaponized by the Assad regime to curtail freedom of association, including by exercising control over the activities and funding sources of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Following the 2011 uprising, repression against civil society escalated into violence perpetrated by the Assad regime and other warring parties. In addition to surviving war and humanitarian crises, organizations and their personnel faced arbitrary detentions, enforced disappearances, and direct attacks, as well as unlawful seizures of their assets and resources. While some organizations and their personnel continued operating within this dangerous security environment in Syria, many were forced into exile or the diaspora to deliver their missions.
The Assad regime’s collapse in 2024 created an unprecedented opening for civil society to operate freely in Syria, with many organizations returning to the country to help rebuild it. Yet the 1958 law continues to govern civil society work today and remains a major obstacle to their ability to work independently without undue executive interference.
The continued enforcement of this law after the fall of the Assad regime has sparked widespread pushback from Syrian NGOs. In October 2025, for instance, organizations mobilized against a directive issued by the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor that reinforced prior approval requirements for receiving foreign funding pursuant to Law No. 93 of 1958. NGOs have called for a suspension of the law’s restrictive provisions until the adoption of a new legal framework becomes possible.
In response, Syria’s Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor convened consultation workshops to lay the groundwork for a new NGO law and appointed a committee of experts to draft it. In October 2026, the ministry published the new law’s first draft for public feedback.
Key takeaways
The October 2026 version of the draft NGO law consists of 205 articles that cover, among other things, principles governing NGO work in Syria, provisions regulating registration, governance, oversight, and sanctions. According to Article 5, the draft law applies only to Syrian NGOs; it does not govern foreign organizations operating in Syria, professional associations, trade unions, or political parties. Despite this, Section 6 of Chapter 1 of the draft law states that the provisions related to foreign NGOs remain under discussion with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, leaving it unclear as to whether foreign NGOs will eventually be governed by this framework or another piece of legislation.
Article 4 sets the law’s objectives, including empowering and strengthening the role of Syrian NGOs in recovery, reconstruction, and development; promoting constitutional rights, such as freedom of expression and assembly; and establishing a participatory approach between government entities and civil society grounded in mutual trust and complementarity. The law also states that it aims to facilitate and expand funding opportunities and foster networking among Syrian and foreign NGOs.
These principles and objectives are a significant departure from the current restrictive framework and are essential to cultivating Syrian civil society’s role in post-conflict recovery
The draft law’s language explicitly recognizes the independence of NGOs. Article 34 states that NGOs enjoy independence in organizing their internal affairs, setting their programs and priorities, and managing their activities and resources. It prohibits any public entity from interfering in organizations’ decisions or management, unless there is a final court ruling and within necessary and proportionate limits. The article also requires that any decision or administrative action impacting organizations’ independence be justified and subject to judicial review.
These principles and objectives are a significant departure from the current restrictive framework and are essential to cultivating Syrian civil society’s role in post-conflict recovery. However, several core provisions risk rendering these guarantees ineffective in practice by enabling undue state interference in NGOs’ work.
Registration
The draft law requires NGOs to obtain prior authorization from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to operate in Syria. Article 20 of the draft law requires an NGO to lodge a registration application with the Directorate of Social Affairs and Labor in the province where the organization is based. Within 50 working days, the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor must make a decision concerning the application.
During the registration period, NGO members may only undertake organizational activities necessary for establishment, but are prohibited from collecting or spending funds. Under Article 194(3-A) of the draft, conducting any activities beyond those necessary for establishment before completing registration triggers sanctions. Criminalizing the activities of unregistered NGOs, as this draft law does, is incompatible with international standards. According to the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, “individuals involved in unregistered associations should indeed be free to carry out any activities, including the right to hold and participate in peaceful assemblies, and should not be subject to criminal sanctions.”
The registration process may result in three outcomes: granting full registration and publishing the official notice of registration in the Official Gazette; requesting additional documents or amendments to bylaws if they conflict with the law; or issuing a written, reasoned rejection citing noncompliance with the NGO law or other applicable Syrian laws. Notably, if the ministry does not take any of these actions within 50 working days, the NGO will be considered automatically registered, and the ministry will be expected to issue an official notice of registration within 10 working days. The law is silent on what would happen should the ministry fail to issue the notice within the prescribed period, creating uncertainty on whether the NGO can practically operate freely or not.
While granting NGOs automatic registration upon the expiry of the 50-day period is a welcome measure, the registration period remains lengthy. There are also concerns about undue delays preventing an NGO from undertaking its activities if an application is rejected and an appeal process has to be pursued, or if additional amendments are required. The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association has emphasized that laws should provide short timeframes to respond to registration applications, and that during this period, “associations should be presumed to be operating legally until it is proven otherwise.”
While organizations can appeal a registration rejection, allowing a rejection to be issued based on noncompliance with other unidentified laws can be problematic. After decades of dictatorship, Syria requires comprehensive legislative reform to repeal laws weaponized by the Assad regime to suppress fundamental freedoms and crack down on dissidents. Conditioning registration on compliance with these laws without ensuring they meet international human rights standards in the first place may leave NGOs vulnerable to arbitrary rejections on vague pretexts. For instance, the registration of an independent media outlet can be rejected on allegations of sharing false news that “undermines the prestige of the state,” which is a vague offense criminalized under the currently in-effect Penal Code and Cybercrime Law.
In this regard, Syrian civil society organizations have urged that the NGO law depart entirely from this authorization model. Instead, they have called for a notification-based system where organizations “automatically acquire legal personality upon submitting a notification to a competent civilian authority.” This notification-based model is encouraged by UN experts, as it better fulfills the state’s obligation to respect and protect the right to freedom of association under international law.
Oversight
The draft law provides three types of state oversight on NGOs: administrative, financial, and technical. While the draft law states that oversight must not jeopardize NGOs’ independence or ability to carry out their legitimate activities, some provisions may still enable undue restrictions and interference.
For instance, Articles 10(2) and 131 empower unidentified ministries and state bodies to exercise technical oversight over organizations’ activities. Article 131 provides that an NGO’s activities of a “specialized nature” are subject to supervision by the relevant ministries or public bodies to ensure compliance with the “technical and professional standards, health and safety requirements, and beneficiary protection measures stipulated in the applicable legislation.” However, the draft does not clarify which activities are of a “specialized nature” and therefore subject to supervision, nor does it specify which ministries and bodies can exercise this power or whether such activities require their prior approval.
Moreover, Article 10(2) empowers these ministries and bodies to suspend activities that deviate from the NGO’s stated mandate or involve serious violations of applicable laws and regulations. Worryingly, the draft fails to define what constitutes a “serious violation” of laws. Article 134 merely notes that such violations involve actions causing significant, irreparable harm or posing an imminent risk, without specifying the nature of that risk or any objective criteria for assessing its likelihood and severity. This vague language may result in arbitrary enforcement subject to individual discretion and thus, unequal application of the law.
Although a suspension of activities can be challenged in court, the lack of clarity on which bodies exercise technical oversight, which specific laws trigger a suspension if violated, and how a serious violation is defined and assessed grants these entities sweeping discretionary authority that may lead to arbitrary decisions.
Prior approval for foreign funds and collaboration
Akin to Law No. 93 of 1958, Articles 168 and 181(2,9) of the draft law require NGOs to obtain prior approval from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to receive foreign funds, with noncompliance triggering fines under Article 194(2-c). Moreover, Article 194(3-b) provides for fines against NGO directors who contribute to the organization “joining, participating in, or affiliating with” a foreign organization without prior approval. Of particular concern, the draft law allows imposing more severe penalties for these violations where such penalties are prescribed by other laws. In this regard, Article 288 of the Syrian Penal Code provides for a prison sentence of up to three years for anyone who engages with an international political or social NGO, or any other NGO of this kind, without government approval. Worryingly, terms such as “joining,” “participating in,” and “engaging with” are overly broad, and criminalizing them risks a chilling effect on Syrian NGOs’ cooperation with international partners, potentially discouraging collaborative activities, from signing joint statements to implementing joint projects.
Moreover, the draft law establishes no criteria for the approval of requests to receive foreign funding or to collaborate with foreign NGOs, leaving that to be determined by the law’s forthcoming executive regulations. The draft also does not require the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to provide a written justification for its decision, which risks unequal application of the law, favoritism, and possible arbitrary interference with NGOs’ funding sources and, therefore, their activities.
These restrictions are at odds with the draft law’s stated objective of facilitating funding opportunities for NGOs and encouraging networking with international organizations. They also disregard Syria’s acute post-conflict realities, where such foreign funds and collaboration are indispensable to rebuild the country and support Syrian civil society efforts. Beyond its incompatibility with international standards, requiring prior approval to receive foreign funds will also create an unnecessary bureaucratic burden on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs tasked with adjudicating these requests.
Dissolution
The draft law grants the judiciary the exclusive power to dissolve an NGO. Restricting this action to the judiciary alone, rather than the executive branch, is a positive step toward ensuring NGOs’ independence and preventing arbitrary dissolution by the executive.
However, the draft law does not establish explicit grounds for judicial dissolution. Article 31 states that NGOs can be forcibly dissolved only by a final court order for “just reasons at the court’s discretion.” Without setting out specific, clear, and exhaustive grounds for dissolving an organization, NGOs will remain vulnerable to unequal application of the law and unpredictable dissolution orders that are subject to politicization.
Why it matters
Over the past decade and a half, Syrian civil society has played a crucial role during the country’s most difficult times. From healthcare, education, and humanitarian relief to documenting atrocities, pursuing accountability, and producing independent reporting, Syrian civil society has not only filled the vacuum left by the state, but also reimagined and worked toward Syria’s future.
Syrian civil society has not only filled the vacuum left by the state, but also reimagined and worked toward Syria’s future
Now more than ever, Syria needs this expertise to help rebuild the country after years of devastating conflict. Syrian NGOs’ capacity, expertise, and impact accumulated over years of crisis, along with their strong reach among local communities and domestic, regional, and international partners, make them an indispensable asset to the country’s transition and recovery.
Activating Syrian NGOs’ role in a post-conflict Syria is a strategic necessity, and drafting a new NGO law presents a historic opportunity to ensure that they can play this role meaningfully. Any NGO law in a post-Assad Syria must safeguard organizations’ autonomy and independence and enable them to activate their role in rebuilding the country without undue interference across registration, operations, and funding. Drafting and adopting a law like this will help the state to establish a relationship with NGOs grounded in trust and collaboration rather than suspicion and antagonism.
What’s next
The deadline for members of the public to submit feedback on the draft law was October 18, 2026. It remains unclear whether the Minister of Social Affairs and Labor will revise the text based on the comments received and, if so, by when.
Meanwhile, Syrian NGOs are calling for an additional three-month period of expanded consultations on the draft law, so that the next version meaningfully eliminates undue state interference and introduces judicial safeguards. Organizations are also calling for their feedback to be meaningfully taken into account and for an update to be provided on the feedback received and considered, and they are urging the People’s Assembly not to consider the current text until key amendments are made.