On October 2, Sisi declared his candidacy for the presidential election, completing what he said was his “dream of a new mandate.” Barring unforeseen circumstances, he should win the elections comfortably—he won the 2014 and 2018 elections with 97 percent of the votes, and this time should not be any different. Amidst a quiet election cycle, Egyptians in the diaspora cast their vote for the first phase of the elections on December 1-3 and turnout appears to have been low. Citizens in Egypt will follow suit this weekend, with votes taking place on December 10-12. Even though the election results will be of no surprise, they are taking place in a uniquely tense climate: the country is in the midst of a severe economic crisis and the war on Gaza has further added tension, reducing the relative political significance of the elections in the grand scheme of Middle Eastern affairs.
The aim of this explainer is to share the important dates and elements of these elections, offer insights into president Sisi’s third candidacy, and provide an understanding of electoral procedures and voting timelines. What comes next will determine how the next six years of Egyptian domestic and regional affairs may look like, and these elections are just the first step.
How is the electoral system structured?
The electoral system in Egypt is a majoritarian two-round system for presidential elections, where the president is elected through direct universal suffrage for a six-year term, normally renewable only once. Although a president cannot serve more than two consecutive terms under Article 140 of the constitution, Sisi is eligible for re-election after the term of office was extended from four to six years by a 2019 constitutional amendment, allowing him to run for a third term. A candidate must secure an absolute majority in the first round; otherwise, a second round is held between the top two candidates.
Eligible candidates must be Egyptian citizens born to Egyptian parents, with neither themselves, their parents, nor their spouses holding other citizenships; they must have completed military service or have received an exemption, and be at least 40 years of age. In order to run for elections, the prospective candidates must receive endorsements from at least 20 members of parliament, or at least 25,000 eligible voters across 15 governorates or more, as outlined in Article 142 of the 2014 Constitution.
The National Election Authority (NEA) is responsible for administering all electoral events in Egypt, including presidential elections. It is made up of 10 members of the judiciary, appointed by the president; it is currently headed by Judge Hazem Badawy, who also serves as the deputy head of the Court of Cassation. The NEA is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the electoral process in Egypt, with its remit including the oversight of voter identification, ballot issuance, and result tabulation. There are 10,085 polling stations across the country and 138 stations in Egyptian consulates and embassies for expatriates. There are 67 million Egyptians who are eligible to vote.
What are the key dates in the electoral schedule?
The presidential elections were originally scheduled for the spring of 2024, but authorities pushed it earlier, which led to speculation that Sisi wants to shore up his legitimacy ahead of painful economic measures.
Voters living outside the country have already cast their ballot on December 1-3 in over 121 countries. The majority of Egyptians abroad live in oil-rich Arab countries, with about a third of the estimated 9 million expatriates residing in Saudi Arabia alone, according to the latest available data. Significant numbers are also present in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, and North America.
Voting inside Egypt will take place on December 10-13. A runoff round, if needed, will take place on January 5-10, with results to be announced on January 16 at the latest.
What happened in previous elections?
Egypt has held three presidential elections since the ouster of long-time ruler Hosni Mubarak in a popular uprising in 2011 as the Arab Spring revolts swept the region.
The 2012 presidential elections saw 12 candidates compete, and is widely regarded as the only free and fair elections in the country’s history. Mohamed Morsi narrowly won the race after a hotly contested runoff round. Twelve months later, Morsi was ousted in a military coup led by Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, the then-minister of defense. Another election was held in 2014, and Sisi competed against one other candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi, and secured a landslide victory with 97 percent of the vote.
In the 2018 election, Sisi again won by the same margin against limited opposition. Serious contenders withdrew or faced repression. Former army chief of staff Sami Anan was arrested, former prime minister and presidential candidate Ahmed Shafik was threatened. Prominent lawyer and activist Khaled Ali and former MP Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat decided against running, on concerns about the elections’ fairness. Voter turnout has also been steadily dropping from nearly 52 percent in 2012 to 41 percent six years later.
What is the larger context in which these elections are taking place?
The political landscape in Egypt is dominated by President Sisi’s regime, widely considered authoritarian. Sisi has consolidated power through a brutal campaign of repression against dissent, eliciting criticism from western governments and rights groups.
Economically, Egypt is in the midst of a severe crisis, marked by record-high inflation driven by a sharp decline in the value of the Egyptian pound and a foreign currency crunch. Households have been suffering from frequent shortages of basic goods, such as sugar and rice, and the government has scheduled regular electricity cuts since the summer to reduce costs.
Egypt’s oil-rich benefactors in the Gulf, who have poured billions of dollars in economic assistance over the past decade, have signaled their reluctance to continue bailing out the nation. Additionally, the International Monetary Fund has halted a $3 billion loan deal it signed with Egypt last year due to the authorities reluctance to enact painful reforms, notably the adoption of an official flexible exchange rate.
External debt has also ballooned to nearly $165 billion by the end of June 2023, up from about $46 billion when Sisi officially assumed power in 2014. One immediate challenge the government will face is financing the $42 billion in debt repayments due in 2024. Sisi’s critics say he squandered billions of dollars pursuing megaprojects of little economic value, such as building a $59 billion new capital city east of Cairo and widening the Suez Canal, all the while increasing the army and state’s economic footprint.
External factors, including the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and the Israeli war on neighboring Gaza have further strained the economy. Rising interest rates in the United States also magnified Egypt’s economic woes, with portfolio investors steering away from risky emerging markets.
The economic crisis has translated into tangible social impacts, with a substantial portion of the population experiencing financial hardship, thus flaring social tensions. Indeed, a growing anger has arisen over the rising costs of basic necessities; staples such as bread, one of the slogans of the 2011 uprising (“bread, freedom, dignity”) have seen their price triple, and the price of key food imports like cooking oil and vegetables have also shot up, putting the squeeze of many Egyptian’s wallets.
What are the relevant rules on electoral campaigning and financing?
While Law No. 174 of 2005 initially dictated that the maximum campaign expenditure for a presidential candidate should not surpass 10 million Egyptian pounds (approximately $200,000), an amendment under Presidential Decree No. 22 of 2014 increased the limit to 20 million Egyptian pounds (approximately $500,000) for the electoral campaign. All campaign expenditures must be transacted through a single bank account at either the National Bank or Banque Misr. Reports on campaign expenditure must be submitted to the Presidential Election Commission (PEC) within 15 days following the election. Additionally, the PEC issued Decision No. 9 of 2012, which assigned a specific committee to monitor and evaluate campaign expenditure. This decision also stipulates fines and imprisonment for candidates who exceed the legally-mandated expenditure limit. The commission also banned electoral campaigning outside the approved period, applying an effective halt of campaigning within two days of the election date.
Presidential elections are also governed by fairly stringent transparency and disclosure requirements. Law 174 of 2005 mandates that presidential candidates must report individual donations above a certain amount of money. Despite this, however, there is limited public disclosure, and reporting requirements for other elections, and party finances in general are relatively lax.
What challenges have domestic and international observers of Egyptian elections faced?
Making sure that electoral laws are followed requires the assistance of both domestic and international third-party observers. These entities are allowed to observe the Egyptian election process, provided they comply with the relevant laws and regulations. Yet, this is not without certain difficulty. Indeed, during Egypt’s 2014 presidential elections, civil society organizations were subjected to numerous restrictive laws as well as arrests and raids, which created a climate of fear and hindered organizations’ ability to operate in a free and effective manner. Domestic and international election observers also encountered hurdles, including limited access, accreditation issues, and strict regulations affecting the transparency of vote counting. While 81 domestic observer groups were legally accredited by the state, concerns arose about the issuance of fewer accreditation codes than requested, resulting in delayed access for some groups. International observers had accreditations rejected without clear explanations, posing challenges to their monitoring efforts. These issues undermine the transparency and fairness of the Egyptian elections, and emphasize the importance of electoral reform, in which civil society and the rule of law can be placed at the forefront.
The same issues persisted in the 2018 elections. While the NEA granted accreditation to 62 organizations, certain groups were rejected for approval; more pertinently, given that all these organizations had been hand-picked by the NEA themselves, their observation work was better described as “symbolic,” as there was not enough scrutiny of the legitimacy of the election or electoral process. Further, the foreign institutions accredited did not include the European Union or Democracy International (that observed the 2014 one), and most of the domestic ones selected had “worked in development and had ties to the regime, or were even state bodies.” Approved entities came from Yemen, the United States, Libya, Sweden, and others, alongside international organizations such as the African Union and Arab League, within both of whom Egypt is a member.
Regarding the upcoming elections, the NEA has accepted requests from various entities, but concerns have again emerged about the continued credibility of the approval process. It issued Decision No. 1 of 2023, and allowed local and international non-governmental organizations, media outlets and diplomats to monitor these upcoming presidential elections. The process was not without its controversy, with the Reform and Development Party, headed by Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat, calling on the army to monitor the elections, if the state did not invite international organizations to take part in the observation process.
What are the procedures on vote counting, processing, and dispute resolution?
Votes are counted first at polling stations, followed by tabulation at general committees, which then report to governorate committees, and then are finally sent to the NEA for consolidation, after which an official announcement is made. Electoral disputes can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court within 48 hours of the NEA’s decisions, including appeals to the final result. The NEA handles electoral disputes during elections, addressing complaints related to voter lists, candidate removals, and more; but, their ability to effectively resolve conflicts has been brought into question.
In 2018, potential presidential candidates Mohamed Anwar El-Sadat and Khaled Ali, raised complaints about rights violations and hindrances during the electoral process. The NEA responded by extending office hours, but dismissed claims that there were any violations or favoritism toward any candidate. Ongoing queries revolve around the NEA’s approach to complaints, and the implications of its issuance of blanket rejections.
Further, instances of vote-buying were reported during Egypt’s constitutional referendum in 2019. Voters from working-class neighborhoods were allegedly bussed into polling stations, and offered food packages to influence their vote in favor of the changes. Vote-buying is explicitly prohibited by Decree-Law No. 45 of 2014, with punishments of a minimum incarceration of one year and fines from 1,000 to 5,000 Egyptian pounds (approximately $20 to $100) for activities that range from threatening voters, financially compensating them for their vote, and circulating ballots used in electoral processes without proper authorization. Similar reports also surfaced during the 2020 senate elections, with Sisi’s allies lacking any sort of substantial political opposition in their ascension to power.
Who else is running for election?
The NEA announced on October 7 that Sisi had obtained the support of 424 members of parliament and 1.13 million citizens to officially run in the upcoming presidential elections. Three other candidates also fulfilled the necessary endorsement requirements to join the race, although critics accuse the state apparatus of holding the ultimate power over who is allowed to run. The other contenders are:
- Farid Zahran, Chairman of the leftist Egyptian Social Democratic Party;
- Abdel Sannad Yamama, Head of the liberal (New) Wafd Party, and;
- Hazem Omar, Head of the People’s Republican Party.
Other individuals had initially declared their intention to join the race. Most notably, Ahmed El-Tantawi, a former MP and the former head of the leftist Al-Karama (Dignity) Party, emerged as a vocal critic of the Egyptian government and the main potential challenger to Sisi’s rule. He later said that he encountered significant challenges and pressure during the endorsement process, such as the arrest of 73 of his supporters, and attempts to hack his phone with Predator spyware. His campaign managed to secure 14,000 endorsements, mainly from Egyptians abroad, short of the necessary minimum, as authorities inside Egypt prevented his supporters from accessing state-controlled notary offices. Tantawi’s campaign documented these violations on its Youtube channel. Authorities now appear to be retaliating, as he currently stands trial for allegedly “circulating election-related papers without official authorization,” among other charges relating to the alleged “manipulation” of the electoral process.
Three other prospective candidates also dropped out: Fouad Badrawi, a former MP and member of the Wafd Party’s Higher Council, who withdrew after significant intra-party conflict; Ahmed El-Fadaly, chairman of the Democratic Peace Party, who did not end up submitting his nomination papers; and Gameela Ismail, chairwoman of the liberal Dostour (Constitution) Party, who failed to meet the nominations threshold, citing the “systematic restrictions” faced by her supporters who tried to nominate her.
The lead-up to the election has already been marred with significant restrictions on the activities of opposition activists. The Civil Democratic Movement, a coalition of 12 parties and public figures, raised concerns over the upcoming elections, describing it as lacking guarantees of fairness. They showcased videos they claim document violations experienced by citizens attempting to support their candidates. Human rights organizations have also raised concerns about arrests, prosecutions, censorship, and the use of spyware.
There have been reports of protests and public unrest in the lead-up to the elections. Small-scale anti-Sisi protests emerged, with videos showing demonstrators calling for the president’s resignation, an exceptional feat given the last years of crackdown on any kind of opposition or dissent.
The results of this latest electoral contest are all-but-determined, with any viable opposition severely diminished and Sisi’s set to retain power. More significant than any election result will be the immediate post-election phase. The government’s management of its worsening economic crisis and the impact of the war on Gaza will be its biggest tests in the short-term. How Sisi deals with these crises could very well define the trajectory of the next six years.
Lisa Guirado is a Legal Intern at TIMEP.