Since the onset of the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, there has been an array of regional and international peace initiatives aimed at ending it. Still, none have had any noticeable impact on the ground thus far. In fact, the chaotic and disjointed mediation attempts have exacerbated divisions among Sudanese civilian groups and created more room for the belligerents to forum-shop.
The most prominent peace initiative was the US-Saudi facilitated Jeddah platform, which started early into the war and went through various versions before being suspended in December 2023. In July 2024, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced that he had invited the SAF and RSF to new peace talks in Geneva starting on August 14, which are set to be co-hosted by Switzerland and Saudi Arabia. While it was stated that the new Sudan talks in Geneva would build on the Jeddah platform, it is still unclear how they differ from or enhance the Jeddah process, as well as other failed mediation attempts.
The international community is dealing with the famine in Sudan as a humanitarian and circumstantial situation, rather than addressing it for what it actually is: man-made and preventable
Notably, while international peace initiatives flounder, the humanitarian situation is worsening, and human rights abuses are multiplying. The already dire humanitarian situation continues to worsen, with almost 11 million people internally displaced and over 25 million people, half of the Sudanese population, experiencing crisis levels of hunger. Famine across Sudan is anticipated to be the deadliest in the world in 40 years, and has already been declared in North Darfur. However, the international community is dealing with the famine in Sudan as a humanitarian and circumstantial situation, rather than addressing it for what it actually is: man-made and preventable. Both of the warring parties have been using starvation as a weapon of war, which amounts to a war crime. Various Sudanese scholars have argued that the suffering of Sudanese civilians is “epic” because of “the world’s ethical and material failure to provide relief for those inside Sudan and fleeing across its borders.”
For what it is worth, the Jeddah platform was the first initiative to bring the Sudanese warring factions to the negotiating table. It succeeded in getting both sides to sign seven short-term ceasefire agreements, as well as a Declaration of Commitment to Protect the Civilians of Sudan. Yet, none of these agreements were honored by the RSF or SAF, and fighting continued throughout all the ceasefires.
Jeddah was not the only platform to bring delegations from the RSF and SAF. In January 2024, There were some high-level and secret talks held in Manama, Bahrain, between the SAF and RSF. The talks also included officials from Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), key supporters of SAF and the RSF respectively. At one stage, it was reported that the two sides had tentatively agreed on a declaration of principles including maintaining the unity of Sudan and its military. However, SAF subsequently withdrew from the talks following pressure from its Islamist supporters.
More recently, UN-facilitated indirect talks took place between the warring parties in Geneva, aimed at brokering local ceasefire agreements and opening humanitarian corridors. These talks were based on two recent UN Security Council resolutions calling for measures to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian assistance and options to protect civilians. However, they ended without any tangible results.
The attempts of powerful Western governments, as well as multilateral international and regional agencies, to end the war in Sudan have shied away from effectively leveraging their power to stop the flow of arms into the country and achieve a lasting ceasefire. The continuation of this approach is unlikely to yield any positive outcomes, unless there is a paradigm shift in the way international actors handle the war in Sudan and their vested interests, with regional actors backing the warring factions. Therefore, the prospective US-sponsored talks in Geneva this month must rethink the mediation strategy and the process if it hopes to attain different results.
The war is not merely an internal power struggle nor simply a proxy war of regional powers. It is a multi-dimensional counterrevolutionary war that is directly supported by internal and external actors
Firstly, there is a need for the mediators to start internalizing a more accurate understanding of the dynamics of the war in Sudan, beyond the obvious power struggle between SAF and RSF. The war is not merely an internal power struggle nor simply a proxy war of regional powers. It is a multi-dimensional counterrevolutionary war that is directly supported by internal and external actors. Therefore, all international actors must use this understanding as a starting point for their mediation initiatives. This definition of the war establishes that the belligerents, the SAF and RSF, are not the only actors in the conflict, hence the design of the peace process should not assume that talking to them exclusively will end the fighting.
The vested interests of the regional backers of the warring factions must be grappled with more seriously. Blinken’s announcement suggesting that the UAE and Egypt will be part of the upcoming Geneva talks as observers is a positive step, but it is not enough. The US and other Western governments with influence over regional backers of the RSF and SAF should exert greater pressure on them ahead of the talks via bilateral meetings at the highest levels. As for the internal spoilers, the mediators should also take into account the influence of the Islamists on SAF’s decision-making.
For these Geneva talks to be productive, mediators must include Sudanese civilian groups to be part of designing and negotiating peace in Sudan from the outset
Secondly, the standard formula of designing peace talks exclusively for the warring factions to sign a ceasefire, without including civilian groups is problematic and leads to the militarization of peace. This is especially the case in the context of Sudan, where starting the war was essentially a political decision. Ceasefires, security arrangements, and facilitation of humanitarian aid are certainly not issues that military actors should decide on without any civilian voices, given that the standard military-military approach has been tried in three different platforms and so far has failed. For these Geneva talks to be productive, mediators must include Sudanese civilian groups to be part of designing and negotiating peace in Sudan from the outset.
In addition, for civilian inclusion to be more constructive, mediators should not solely focus on including elite political groups that are part of the conflict dynamics in one way or another, like the Sudanese Coordination of Civil Democratic Forces (Taqaddum). Rather, they should also include grassroots civilian groups who have greater legitimacy on the ground as they continue to unwaveringly support the people caught in the crossfire.
It has been reported that the US Secretary of State Office for Global Women’s Issues and other international partners have invited a group of Sudanese women leaders to Geneva, coinciding with the peace talks, to participate in meetings on the war’s impact on women and girls. Although it is not clear how these meetings will feed into the peace talks, it is still important to have Sudanese women groups present to influence talks informally. It would be crucial to replicate this approach with other grassroots groups, including the Emergency Response Rooms that are leading the humanitarian response and the many youth groups that are monitoring and documenting the war atrocities. Such groups can act as civilian observers to exert greater pressure on the warring factions.
As both the SAF and RSF have an interest in keeping civilians out of the talks, the inclusion of civilian groups may be met with hostility from the belligerents and could initially complicate the process. However, the peace process must not be deferential to the warring factions. Even if civilian groups do not have direct negotiating power, their presence would provide them with opportunities to influence the agenda and discussions and would send a clear message to the warring factions that they cannot decide on the fate of the country without civilian input.
Furthermore, the Geneva peace talks are designed to focus on getting the belligerents to sign a ceasefire agreement, a crucial goal. Without a ceasefire, establishing safe passages and humanitarian corridors will remain elusive. However, as the history of ceasefires in Sudan demonstrates, ceasefires alone do not protect the lives of civilians. Multiple ceasefires were signed in Jeddah after the onset of the ongoing conflict last year, and have allowed the belligerents to cement their positions and make military advancements, while the world was looking away. Discussing a ceasefire agreement must be complemented with discussions on options for civilian protection, including establishing a peacekeeping mission. As Sudanese analyst Kholood Khair stressed in a statement at the UN Security Council, civilian protection is the priority of the hour.
The worsening humanitarian situation and the keen anticipation of the Sudanese people, necessitate revitalized and innovative approaches to avoid the mistakes of the Jeddah talks, as well as the former UN-facilitated Geneva talks and the Manama talks
The peace talks in Geneva will be mired by complexities for numerous reasons. Achieving a genuine ceasefire agreement, or even humanitarian access or civilian protection mechanisms, is challenging even under the best circumstances. Yet, the worsening humanitarian situation and the keen anticipation of the Sudanese people, necessitate revitalized and innovative approaches to avoid the mistakes of the Jeddah talks, as well as the former UN-facilitated Geneva talks and the Manama talks. Prior attempts to end the war in Sudan failed in large part because the mediators did not employ their collective leverage properly, thereby allowing SAF and RSF to use these talks to make political scores. The mediators of the Geneva talks should continue exerting pressure on the warring factions, through their regional backers, to guarantee the genuine participation of their respective leaders.
For their part, the RSF agreed enthusiastically to participate in the talks. However, the military group’s enthusiasm for international mediation efforts is largely predicated on a desire to portray itself as a legitimate actor. Its promises cannot be relied upon on the ground, both because it has no genuine interest in honoring them and because it barely controls its own military forces. Meanwhile the SAF has been reluctant to agree to the talks. The group requested a consultation meeting with the US in Jeddah, which ended with no agreement. In the same vein, there is also a history of the SAF going to talks and subsequently withdrawing under pressure from Islamists, who are influential within the army. As such, mediators need to preserve the momentum and credibility of the peace process and accelerate their collective efforts to bring the belligerents to the talks, especially before the US turns its attention to the upcoming presidential elections in November.
The Geneva talks are off to a bumpy start, with the RSF delegation arriving in the city and the SAF still abstaining. Should the Geneva talks fail to deliver, they risk diluting future mediation efforts and exacerbating divisions among the international community. The floundering of peace talks will be harmful and will complicate the situation in a way that Sudanese people on the ground cannot afford, as the country is likely to slide further into chaos with dire humanitarian consequences. The international community’s efforts to address the war in Sudan and the needs of the Sudanese people have been lackluster, and the Geneva talks might be the last chance to rectify that.
Hamid Khalafallah is a former Nonresident Fellow at TIMEP focusing on inclusive governance and mobilization in Sudan. He is a development practitioner, researcher, and policy analyst.