The recent failure of the high-level Sudan peace talks convened by Washington at the end of July is yet another episode of the problematic approach of centering the role of Sudan’s warring parties to end the war. While no official explanation was offered by Washington, it was reported that there were disagreements within the Quartet group (the United States, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates) about the role of the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in Sudan’s political future.
The RSF and SAF have focused on asserting their legitimacy soon after the war broke out in Sudan in April 2023, with both belligerents crafting narratives to justify their war efforts, citing sovereignty, national unity, democracy, or marginalization. In recent months, after some levels of territorial lines were established—with SAF controlling central, northern and eastern parts of the country, while the RSF and their allies control most of western and southern Sudan—both warring factions have launched efforts to create parallel civilian governments in areas under their control to assert their political legitimacy. This marks a significant change in the dynamics of the war: the focus of the belligerents has shifted from military advancements on the ground to competition over political dominance, even as the conflict continues to devastate the country and fragment its political landscape.
The announcement of the SAF government in Port Sudan in eastern Sudan and the RSF government in Nyala in western Sudan, just before the planned date of the Quartet meeting, was not a coincidence. It points to the strong interest of SAF and the RSF in shaping Sudan’s political future, even if it comes at the cost of dividing the country, further prolonging the war, and diminishing any remaining hopes for a meaningful transition to civilian rule. The emergence of the Port Sudan and Nyala governments is indeed a historical shift, where Sudan witnesses two rival governments within its borders, for the first time since gaining independence in 1956.
Competing civilian governments: A new front in the war for legitimacy
The fierce race to install rival civilian governments reveals the underlying power struggle driving Sudan’s counterrevolutionary war: both factions and their allies are ultimately fighting to rule the country and protect their own interests. These so-called civilian structures are not meant to serve the Sudanese people; they are mechanisms to consolidate control and gain international legitimacy, confirming that the narratives they have been spreading are largely war propaganda. As such, their legitimacy remains deeply contested.
Though both SAF and the RSF claim to be establishing civilian technocratic governments, these are, in reality, power-sharing arrangements dominated by armed actors, with a decorative civilian presence. The purpose of these announcements is to present a reformist image to international and regional allies and to signal governance capacity. In doing so, both SAF and the RSF undermine genuine civilian governance and obstruct any real path to democratic transition.
These so-called civilian structures are not meant to serve the Sudanese people; they are mechanisms to consolidate control and gain international legitimacy
In May 2025, SAF’s commander-in-chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan appointed former United Nations official Kamil Idris as prime minister and announced forming a new technocratic government dubbed the “Hope Government,” from Port Sudan, which became SAF’s capital after the eruption of conflict in Khartoum. Though presented as a step toward inclusive governance, this move deepened rifts within SAF-aligned groups. Many of these groups—particularly signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement (JPA)—viewed Idris’ unilateral appointments as a breach of power-sharing commitments. The JPA was signed in 2020 and meant to integrate armed movements into Sudan’s transitional government, by granting them seats in the cabinet, among other provisions. Tensions escalated as Idris began appointing technocratic ministers, prompting backlash from JPA-affiliated parties who demanded their agreed share of posts. SAF ultimately intervened to broker a compromise, and Idris eventually included ministers from JPA-affiliated parties. While this temporarily calmed the situation, it also exposed the fragility of the SAF coalition.
SAF’s political maneuvering and bid for legitimacy has led to both political and military complications. JPA signatories, particularly armed movements from Darfur, have formed the Joint Forces after the 2023 war outbreak, a military coalition that has supported SAF in key battlefield advances. These groups had also aligned with SAF following the 2021 military coup. SAF risks serious setbacks if it loses the Joint Forces’ support—especially as the battle for el-Fashir, the last major SAF-held city in Darfur, intensifies.
The episode also led to various frustrations among SAF supporters, who had hoped for a truly civilian technocratic government that would serve the people, as the population continues to endure a worsening humanitarian crisis amid collapsing healthcare and public services systems.
Yet, the main obstacle standing in the way of establishing this civilian technocratic government is SAF’s lack of political will and its vested interest in maintaining power. SAF’s record casts doubt on its commitment to civilian rule, as time and again, it has failed to uphold promises of civilian-led governance and democratic transition.
Similarly, the RSF has moved to formalize its political ambitions: In April 2025, the RSF-backed “Tasees” alliance announced the formation of a “Government of Peace and Unity” to govern RSF-held territories. However, deep internal disagreements soon emerged over power distribution. The Tasees alliance, forged entirely during this war, lacks ideological coherence and historical unity, and its members have no record of political collaboration or shared long-term vision.
Eventually, and after months of tense deliberations, Tasees announced the formation of their parallel government, from Nyala, the largest city in the Darfur region, which the RSF controls most of. The alliance named Mohamed Hassan al-Taishi, a former civilian member of the post-revolution Transitional Sovereign Council, as their prime minister. The rest of the government is formed of the RSF and their allied armed movements and political parties.
It is clear that both the RSF and SAF governmental coalitions remain inherently fragile, as military cooperation does not equate to political unity
Initially, the RSF’s push to establish the Tasees alliance appeared to be a calculated attempt to rebrand itself and secure a political future despite the atrocities it had committed, and the recent losses on the battlefield it endured. However, the appointment of RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti) as the head of the alliance in their latest structure undermines that very effort. It exposes the Tasees initiative not as a genuine attempt at political transformation, but rather as an extension of RSF’s military dominance under a new political label.
It is clear that both the RSF and SAF governmental coalitions remain inherently fragile, as military cooperation does not equate to political unity. Disagreements over power-sharing within the proposed parallel governments risk fracturing their internal alliances, potentially leading to further violence and destabilization. Furthermore, they both lack the ability and willingness to govern. SAF had over two years as the de facto government since the war erupted to prioritize service provision and civilian protection, but they did not. Also, the RSF had previously established civilian administrations in multiple cities that were under their control, but they too largely failed in providing any form of governance.
Co-optation of civilian groups to cover for military rule
In Sudan’s recent political history, the appointment of civilian figures by military leaders to create a veneer of legitimacy is not new. Indeed, following the 2021 military coup, the military council reappointed Abdalla Hamdok—the very civilian prime minister it had ousted—to head a new government. He soon resigned, realizing he lacked any real autonomy. After that, the military installed several civilian ministers who reported directly to the council. Although a civilian prime minister was never appointed thereafter, the military continued to use civilian appointments to bolster its standing in international forums.
It is also telling that al-Burhan and Hemedti, then head and deputy of the military council, began wearing civilian suits rather than military uniforms—seeking to portray themselves as political leaders rather than military strongmen.
The war began against the backdrop of a constitutional vacuum and legitimacy crisis. Neither SAF nor the RSF have any legitimacy to rule. Due to the 2021 coup, both parties lack a legal or constitutional mandate to govern. Moreover, the atrocities and human rights abuses they both committed against Sudanese civilians during the ongoing war deprive them of moral legitimacy. SAF and the RSF are aiming to hold power by force, not by law or popular support. Yet both factions have drawn encouragement from international precedents. After the 2018 revolution, the international community—namely the United Nations and the African Union—pushed for a power-sharing agreement between civilians and the military, effectively legitimizing military involvement in governance. Following the 2021 military coup, international engagement with al-Burhan and Hemedti continued, treating them as political stakeholders rather than armed leaders who orchestrated a coup.
Sudan’s fragile social fabric faces long-term damage
The co-optation of civilian groups by the military has previously led to fragmentation among civilian groups, including the split of the Forces of Freedom and Change, a large civilian coalition that emerged during Sudan’s 2018 revolution. SAF’s and RSF’s processes to form parallel administrations have further intensified tensions and fragmentation among Sudanese civilian groups, many of whom now face pressure—along ethnic, tribal, or regional lines—to align with one faction or the other. As a result, Sudan’s fragile social fabric faces long-term damage.
Furthermore, the militarization of political space and the growing hostility toward all forms of political dialogue have severely weakened the ability of civilian groups to act independently or collectively. Their diminishing influence risks allowing military actors to consolidate long-term control, undermining prospects for future democratic governance.
The recognition trap: Challenges for regional and global actors
Given the scale of atrocities committed by both sides and the international sanctions they face—particularly with the RSF being accused of genocide in West Darfur and SAF of using chemical weapons—international actors will face serious ethical and political challenges if they move to recognize either of these rival governments. The international community should avoid framing the discourse as a comparison of which belligerent committed fewer atrocities, and thus deserves recognition. At the same time, regional backers are increasingly aligning with one side or the other, which will complicate efforts to establish a more inclusive regional and international mediation process. This challenge has already compromised the Sudan Quartet meeting and possibly contributed to calling it off, as the Quartet countries lacked a shared vision about the approach and expected outcomes and the future of SAF and the RSF.
After accelerating the process of forming their civilian governments, ahead of the proposed Quartet meeting, both SAF and the RSF are highly likely to condition their participation in any future peace process on international recognition of their respective governments. This dynamic threatens to derail mediation efforts, unless peacemaking takes precedence over questions of legitimacy.
[The SAF’s and RSF’s] competing bids to form parallel civilian governments reflect not only a desire for recognition, but a broader struggle to shape Sudan’s post-war political order
The US and other mediators should ensure that establishing a peace process does not come at the cost of legitimizing belligerents and recognizing their civilian façades. Instead, they should engage genuine civilian groups, who are not affiliated with either of the warring parties, and ensure that the negotiating table is built on civilians’ agenda and centers their voices. Civilian groups have offered advice, particularly for the Quartet meeting, on civilian priorities and the steps required to end the war in Sudan, while ensuring a peaceful democratic transition in Sudan. However, the US has not engaged with any Sudanese civilian actors ahead of the process, and there has been little transparency regarding the convening, its agenda, or the reasons behind its postponement. The process should actively seek input from Sudanese civilian actors to ensure local ownership from the outset.
The war in Sudan is increasingly defined by ethnic, regional, and political fragmentation, as SAF and the RSF draw support from distinct constituencies and foreign backers. Their competing bids to form parallel civilian governments reflect not only a desire for recognition, but a broader struggle to shape Sudan’s post-war political order. Yet, neither faction has demonstrated the capacity to govern, protect civilians, or end the violence. As the war escalates and governance fractures, neither government offers real hope, peace, or unity. Without a shift toward inclusive, civilian-led negotiation, the prospects of a political settlement and a return to democratic rule remains alarmingly remote.
Hamid Khalafallah is a former Nonresident Fellow at TIMEP focusing on inclusive governance and mobilization in Sudan. He is a development practitioner, researcher, and policy analyst.