Egypt is set to hold elections for its House of Representatives on November 10 and 11, 2025, following last August’s Senate elections, in a political environment tightly managed by security agencies. These elections are significant for their timing: they will be the last elections before the end of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi’s third and final term in 2030. This positions the new parliament as a central actor in Egypt’s political trajectory—it will either pave the way for a constitutional amendment that would extend Sisi’s term or prepare the ground for a post-Sisi political transition.
For this reason, these legislative elections represent a pivotal political moment for Egypt; one that exposes the underlying structure of the country’s political system, its relationship with society, and the deepening consolidation of authoritarian rule.
Understanding the elections and the electoral law
Egypt’s parliament consists of two chambers: the House of Representatives, the primary legislative body responsible for drafting laws and overseeing government action, and the Senate, which was reinstated in 2020 with an advisory role and no binding authority.
The August 2025 Senate elections recorded a low voter turnout (about 17 percent) and were dominated by pro-regime alliances. Reports indicated direct involvement of security agencies in picking candidate lists, which reinforce the perception of the Senate as an institution without genuine authority.
In May 2025, the parliament passed minor amendments to the electoral law, mainly redrawing district boundaries to reflect demographic changes. Yet the law’s fundamental issue remains unaddressed: It is an electoral system designed to exclude political pluralism and limit popular representation.
The law stipulates a 596 seat House of Representatives, with 284 individual candidates, 284 closed lists, and 28 appointed by the president. Individual candidates must secure an absolute majority—either in a single round or a runoff—and compete in large constituencies that favor those with local influence, security ties, and financial resources over independents or opposition figures with limited means. The closed list system is even more restrictive: No party can gain a seat unless its entire list secures over 50 percent of the votes. If no list meets that threshold, a runoff is held between the top two lists, and the winner takes the seats, effectively excluding smaller or independent political parties. As a result, the parliament lacks proportional representation and voters are denied meaningful choice within lists.
As a result, the parliament lacks proportional representation and voters are denied meaningful choice within lists
Opposition groups, most notably the Civil Democratic Movement, have called for proportional representation, arguing that it would ensure a fairer seat distribution and real pluralism. In the previous elections, the current system produced a parliament incapable of challenging the government, mounting effective opposition, or facilitating public debate. Maintaining the same electoral law will most likely reproduce another compliant parliament.
In other words, the issue is not simply who wins the elections, but rather how the political system itself is designed. The electoral law is structured to exclude pluralism and produce a parliament devoid of real opposition or representation, at a critical moment for Egypt’s political future.
Why are these elections crucial?
The upcoming parliamentary elections cannot be understood in isolation from their broader context. According to the 2019 constitutional amendments, Sisi’s third and final term is set to end in 2030. These amendments extended the presidential term from four to six years and retroactively counted Sisi’s term at the time as his first.
This means that this upcoming parliament will be the one in place before the end of Sisi’s presidency, positioning it as a central actor in shaping Egypt’s political trajectory. According to Article 226 of the Constitution, any constitutional amendment requires the approval of two-thirds of parliament before being put to a public referendum. Thus, if the Egyptian authorities decide to extend Sisi’s presidency, they will need to do it through the parliament. Alternatively, if constitutional change is avoided, parliament will be responsible for overseeing the political transition.
The composition of that parliament will directly reflect the Egyptian authorities’ intentions for the future
In short, the 2025 parliament will serve as both a legal and political instrument through which the Egyptian authorities channel key post-2030 decisions. The composition of that parliament will directly reflect the Egyptian authorities’ intentions for the future. Replicating today’s compliant legislature would effectively shut the door to any organized political debate.
A restricted political context
The upcoming elections are taking place in a highly constrained political environment, characterized in recent years by the erosion of public space, declining pluralism, and growing restrictions on political and media actors. The press has been brought under near-total state control, the judiciary has lost its independence, and laws have criminalized dissent and political expression.
Since 2013, political parties have been either dissolved or co-opted, while independent opposition candidates have faced imprisonment, harassment, or exile. The most recent example is Ahmed al-Tantawy, who was barred from running for president, later imprisoned, charged with new offenses, and banned from running for elections for five years. This pattern mirrors the 2020 crackdown on the “Coalition of Hope,” whose members were detained ahead of that year’s parliamentary elections.
Within this landscape, elections occur under a distorted dynamic, where candidates are not selected for their political programs or competence, but rather for their access to campaign resources and support from security officials. Security agencies tightly control the selection of candidates on closed lists and restrict independent candidates in individual districts. Nevertheless, political funding has become a decisive factor in a candidate’s success, and security approval alone is no longer sufficient.
Initial costs such as medical exams and election deposits can reach around 41,000 Egyptian pounds (around $860), while campaign expenses could rise to hundreds of thousands of Egyptian pounds. Hanan Fayez, a leader in the Protectors of the Homeland Party, disclosed that securing a parliamentary seat through the party could cost as much as 50 million pounds (about $1 million). Established parties like the National Progressive Unionist Party withdrew from competing for individual seats, citing their inability to cover the costs and emphasizing that the current financial requirements clearly exceed their available resources.
Fragmentation of the opposition
Despite all the restrictions and repression, some political forces continue to maneuver within the limited space available, forming independent electoral alliances or engaging in restricted arrangements with the Egyptian authorities. Opposition strategies vary: some seek symbolic participation to signal their presence, while others attempt to build a viable political alternative.
Opposition strategies vary: some seek symbolic participation to signal their presence, while others attempt to build a viable political alternative
The Civil Democratic Movement, a coalition of civil opposition parties and independent figures, initially proposed a unified opposition list under the closed-list system. However, these efforts faltered as some affiliated parties negotiated with pro-regime parties and others withdrew entirely. Within this context, the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, Justice Party, and Reform and Development Party broke away from the Civil Democratic Movement to form a new alliance, competing for individual seats while coordinating with pro-regime parties on the National List under a limited seat-sharing arrangement. This move drew criticism from the Civil Democratic Movement, which threatened to expel parties entering alliances with the regime. Al-Dostour and the Conservative Party, broke away from the coalition and formed the Free Path Alliance, choosing to compete independently in individual districts to create an alternative political space without direct confrontation with the authorities. Consequently, the Civil Democratic Movement limited its participation to individual seats. And former presidential candidate Ahmed al-Tantawy’s Hope Current Party announced it would run independently in individual districts, separate from regime-affiliated lists.
These developments illustrate a fragmented opposition landscape marked by divergent strategies; some parties are banking on symbolic participation, while others are striving to build an independent political alternative.
Meanwhile, the regime is already preparing to consolidate control by advancing its own electoral lists. This is embodied in the “National List in Support of Egypt” alliance, led by the National Front parties, the Youth Coordination of Parties and Politicians, and the Nation’s Future Party. Within this framework, seats are distributed among loyalist parties and select actors from the limited “approved” space, while the opposition is left to compete symbolically for a handful of individual seats in a tightly controlled electoral environment.
A narrow window for alternative voices
Despite the closure of public space and the erosion of avenues for expression, these elections carry heightened significance, even if they unfold under the same instruments of repression and security control. Even with such constraints, elections can offer a narrow window to convey an alternative message: that political options still exist, that opposition voices remain, and that politicians capable of responsible governance could lead differently if given the opportunity.
The presence of genuine opposition voices—even if few and constrained—is not a luxury but a necessity. These voices can expose the falsity of the political game, dismantle the state’s narrative, and mobilize public opinion against repression and monopolized power, even from within the sole remaining formal political arena.
Halem Henish is a Legal Associate at TIMEP. He is an Egyptian human rights lawyer and consultant specializing in criminal justice issues, with a focus on prosecuting perpetrators and securing justice for victims of violations.