With an anticipated turnout of half the world’s population at the ballot boxes this year, Tunisian voters are gearing up for their third presidential election since the 2011 Revolution. However, against the backdrop of an authoritarian turn initiated by President Saied since July 25, 2021, the upcoming 2024 presidential elections in Tunisia present a starkly different political landscape from its predecessors. Conducted under intense scrutiny from both domestic and international observers, these elections mark a critical juncture in Tunisia’s democratic journey. If they take place.
The prospect of a presidential election in Tunisia by the end of the year seemed increasingly likely during the months of February until end of April as reiterated by members of the electoral body in charge of elections and hinted at by the president himself. A concrete date remains elusive, however, casting shadows on the process just months before President Saied’s term is due to end in 2024. Some of the uncertainty on the likelihood of timely elections taking place comes from two concerning developments. First, the inexplicable delay in the Independent High Authority for Elections’ press conference which was supposed to be held at the beginning of May to announce the electoral roadmap and a final date for the first round of elections. Second, these delays are intertwined with a human rights crisis that is taking shape in Tunisia. Against a backdrop of official conspiracy rhetoric, in recent weeks the authorities have resumed their repression of migrants, escalated attacks on civil society, and intensified arrests of human rights defenders, journalists, and lawyers.
Additionally, President Saied vowed in February and April 2024, that he would “not surrender the country to thieves who talk about elections” or to “those who throw themselves into the arms of foreign entities,” hinting at a potential will to cast out candidates, or even reject election outcomes.
The democratic transition, the ISIE, and free elections
During the years of democratic transition post-2011, Tunisia took pride in its successful organization of free and fair elections. This included the election of President Saied to the presidency of the republic with 2.7 millions votes in 2019, a plebiscite which would then provide him with legitimacy for the unilateral actions he has taken since July 2021.
While it is important to recognize that previous elections witnessed some irregularities such as suspicions of foreign financing of campaigns, charity organizations that served as façade to political projects, as well as minor infractions during election days, they were praised by national and international observers alike as largely compliant to criterion of free and fair elections; a significant achievement for a country that had never experienced such elections prior to the 2011 revolution.
These successful elections relied on the Independent High Authority for Elections (ISIE). Established to organize the 2011 constituent assembly elections, ISIE was constitutionalized in 2014 and has supervised all elections since 2011.
The ISIE, whose members are elected by parliament upon propositions from parliamentary blocs, has never been entirely insulated from political influences or immune to mismanagement. But the institution withstood its various crises and accumulated experience, all the while remaining open to civil society and political parties. It constituted one of the pillars and success stories of Tunisia’s democratic and institutional development.
The first round of elections is supposed to be held between July and October 2024, and the fact the ISIE has still not fixed an election day with less than a few months before the first round of presidential elections is unprecedented
Although falling uniquely within the prerogatives of the ISIE, the establishment of the electoral calendar (and the choosing of election dates), has regularly been a point of contention between the ISIE and future contenders who regularly criticized ISIE’s choices with that regard. But despite political pressures, the ISIE has historically stood its ground. Since July 2021, the story has changed; election dates, whether for the legislature or for the referendum, have all been chosen by the President of the republic.
Today, the first round of elections is supposed to be held between July and October 2024, and the fact the ISIE has still not fixed an election day with less than a few months before the first round of presidential elections is unprecedented. The ISIE’s reticence is a strong indicator that the body is waiting for a green light from the republic’s presidency before proceeding.
The authoritarian drift, the president’s elections, and an aggressive ISIE
President Saied buried the independence of the ISIE on May 2, 2022. In preparation for the referendum on his new constitution—where the ISIE’s independence remains theoretically enshrined—Saied adopted Decree-Law 22 granting him sole authority to appoint and dismiss members of the institution. This undemocratic maneuver which provoked national and international outcry was also strongly criticized by the Venice Commission—an advisory body of the Council of Europe—who recommended the repeal of Decree-Law 22.
Concerns over the independence of the ISIE have been validated over time. The ISIE has indeed turned into an institution that merely implements elections according to the interests and directives of the executive. Even more troubling is its transformation into a staunch supporter of President Saied and his agenda, shutting out political parties and civil society organizations that were once welcomed.
The institution also displays concerning levels of aggression toward its critics, issuing threats to media and civil society organizations (CSOs) (including threats to withdraw accreditation from CSOs who observe elections) that question its independence or competence. It regularly sues political opponents of President Saied, making the institution a champion of Decree-Law 54, enshrined in 2022 to nominally combat cybercrime but now largely used to silence criticism of the regime, and sometimes triggering the imprisonment of these opponents.
A rule of law crisis that keeps spiraling
Although central, the lack of independence of the electoral body is only a part of a bigger puzzle that constitutes the absence of rule of law and checks and balances during Tunisia’s electoral year. A critical missing element is the Constitutional court, a cornerstone institution in a modern state with a system of checks and balances. Nearly two years after the adoption of the 2022 constitution, the establishment of the Constitutional Court remains incomplete; a particularly perplexing situation given that its formation requires only a few procedural steps as outlined in the new constitution.
The regime’s recent actions concerning the judiciary speak volumes to its intentions. Despite replacing the elected High Judicial Council with a temporary body appointed by the president and arbitrarily dismissing 57 judges, these actions have not achieved their desired outcomes. The temporary High Judicial Council has been rendered ineffective by the Ministry of Justice’s failure to fill vacancies left by retired members. Judges and prosecutors—including in high-ranking positions—are now dismissed and relocated by verbal notes and text messages. The climate of intimidation this creates will not be without consequences on the impartiality of courts in electoral disputes.
This climate of terror within the judiciary severely impacts political freedoms in Tunisia
More concretely, this climate of terror within the judiciary severely impacts political freedoms in Tunisia. Many political leaders, across the spectrum, find themselves either imprisoned or facing prosecutions, often for merely criticizing the president’s record. Out of the 10 candidates who expressed their intent to run for office, representing the most serious contenders, four are currently facing prosecution, while two are already behind bars. Conspiracy cases are mushrooming, and repression now affects everybody; lawyers, journalists, activists, businessmen, but also ordinary citizens with no political affiliations.
What does this mean for eligibility to the presidential election? The ISIE announced that it would simply align its conditions for presidential elections with the 2022 constitution which raises the minimum age requirement to 40 years old and prohibits dual citizens from running for office, without amending the electoral law. Although seemingly compliant with international standards for elections that advise against changing fundamental aspects to the election system “one year prior to an election,” the ISIE’s new conditions are a legal aberration and problematic on many levels.
The devil is in the details
Indeed, the ISIE plans to introduce a requirement for candidates to provide a copy of their criminal record, echoing a previous attempt in 2019 aimed at sidelining candidate Nabil Karoui, which civil society strongly opposed. This new condition is particularly concerning for at least half of the candidates who are either prosecuted or behind bars, given that obtaining such documents when under prosecution is nearly impossible. Moreover, this requirement could be unconstitutional. Only a final, complementary judicial decision from a court can strip a citizen of their political and civil rights, not an administration that denies essential documents.
It is also very likely that the ISIE will uphold the requirement of 10,000 certified signatures for candidate sponsorship. However, in the current climate of rising authoritarianism, fear, and repression, ordinary citizens may hesitate to openly support opposition candidates by providing their signatures for registration at government administrations.
No free and fair elections without freedom of expression
Since President Saied’s power grab, freedom of expression in Tunisia has suffered a severe blow. Utilizing both existing and newly implemented repressive legal texts—such as the infamous Decree-Law 54—the regime has targeted journalists, activists, and opposition figures, prosecuting and imprisoning them simply for exercising their fundamental right to free speech or for carrying out their professional duties as journalists. Currently, 41 journalists are being prosecuted in Tunisia, and four of them are behind bars. Recent developments also show that the regime now seeks to intimidate any dissenting voice, however soft it may be. A few weeks ago, Sonia Dahmani, a lawyer and columnist, was brutally abducted in front of international TV cameras and taken into custody for mocking the president’s speech on migration policies. Shortly after, her colleagues from the same morning show, Mourad Zeghidi and Borhane Bsaies, were also arrested unexpectedly and kept in custody “for social media posts and declarations that offend the President of the Republic.” They have since then been sentenced to one year in prison for “fake news” and defamation, and remain under investigation for “money laundering” and “illicit enrichment” cases initiated after their initial sentences.
Decree-Law 54 has also emerged as a potent tool not only for suppressing political dissent but also for silencing criticism from ordinary citizens
Decree-Law 54 has also emerged as a potent tool not only for suppressing political dissent but also for silencing criticism from ordinary citizens, particularly on social media platforms. Despite growing calls from new MPs for its amendment, corrupt or incompetent decision-makers have found this Decree-Law to be a convenient means of intimidating and prosecuting individuals who criticize them.
In an environment where media and journalists are increasingly demonized, including by the president and his supporters, reports from the National Syndicate for Tunisian Journalists have revealed a concerning rise in attacks and assaults targeting journalists, photographers, and cameramen, especially during election periods. With political polarization on the rise and the upcoming elections poised to be highly contentious, there is a strong likelihood that this trend will continue to escalate in the coming months.
Beyond repression and violence, there are several other troubling issues regarding media and freedom of speech during this electoral year. Public media, particularly public TV, has conspicuously excluded opposition figures from its programming since July 25, 2021, raising concerns about its impartiality and role in shaping public discourse. Meanwhile, private media outlets are practicing self-censorship, fearing reprisals following the arbitrary arrest and release of Noureddine Boutar, the head of leading radio Mosaique FM. His arrest, along with the recent questioning of legal representatives of private radios IFM and Diwan FM and the frenzied implementation of Decree 54, coupled with President Saied’s campaign against business figures, has had a chilling effect on media owners.
As a concession, all political shows on private media now feature “pro-regime” or “pro-July 25” columnists, effectively guaranteeing the president a permanent presence in the public debate. Such unequal representation among candidates, coupled with the recent neutralization of the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HAICA), further tilts the playing field and significantly threatens the overall fairness of the electoral process.
Civil society’s challenges and political parties dilemmas
The current political landscape presents a dilemma for political parties and figures aiming to restore democracy in Tunisia. While the upcoming elections offer an opportunity to peacefully reclaim power and restore democratic processes, the risks of participating in an electoral process devoid of norms for free and fair elections is high, while the chance of success is slim.
Should Kais Saied emerge victorious, his administration will likely silence any debates questioning the legality of Saied’s actions since the coup on July 25, 2021. This outcome would pave the way for him to further entrench his political agenda and suppress dissenting voices.
Political parties must proceed with the utmost caution in the current climate. Considering the impossibility of presenting a united front, they should strive to unite around several demands constituting a bare minimum for free elections such as: releasing political prisoners, reinstating arbitrarily dismissed judges and restoring an independent high judicial council, repealing Decree-Law 54 and halting attacks on freedom of expression, reinstating the HAICA, refraining from imposing conditions that are impossible to meet for candidates, and ensuring the independence of the ISIE. In essence, these elections should be an opportunity to reclaim some of the democratic progress lost since July 25, 2021, restore spaces for political contestation and quash widespread political apathy.
Should they decide to run, democratic actors must be cautious not to repeat past mistakes, such as solely opposing a political rival and instead promote a constructive political vision for the country. They should aim to persuade the Tunisian people that the current populist and authoritarian agenda is a dead end, while simultaneously presenting a viable social, economic, and political alternative.
Civil society for its part should monitor and ensure the integrity of the electoral process this year and vigorously denounce any attacks on candidates, regardless of their affiliations.
In addition to uniting for a threshold for free and fair elections, civil society organizations should seize this opportunity to conduct a comprehensive assessment of the five-year mandate, across all sectors and with a particular focus on President Saied’s three years of undivided rule. Efforts should be concentrated on widely disseminating the assessment’s findings to Tunisian citizens through various mediums.It is imperative for civil society to remain vigilant of what lies ahead, considering that it will require an exceptionally democratic winning candidate to relinquish the sweeping powers granted by the 2022 Constitution and to restore Tunisia’s embryonic system of checks and balances. One dictator usually hides another.
Lamine Benghazi is a former Nonresident Fellow at TIMEP focusing on rule of law and the judiciary in Tunisia, with particular attention to criminal justice reform, transitional justice, and the independence of the judiciary.